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1 
Abstract 
While previous research on the reciprocal effects of citizens’ issue attitudes and their party support 
emphasize citizens’ issue positions, political competition revolves equally around issue salience, i.e., 
debates over which issue areas political parties should prioritize.  Using multi-wave panel survey da-
ta from Germany and Great Britain, we analyze the reciprocal effects of citizens’ issue salience and 
their party support, and we conclude that citizens’ issue priorities both influence and are influenced 
by their party attachments, and, moreover, that these effects are linked to parties’ long-term associa-
tive issue ownership.  This effect is strongest among supporters of a small issue-orientated niche par-
ty, the German Greens.  
The study of how citizens’ issue considerations influence their votes has prompted two, related, 
research agendas.  The first, which is emphasized by spatial modelers and by many behavioral 
researchers, is that parties offer competing issue positions to voters whose decisions turn on the 
match between their own policy beliefs and parties’ positions.2  This positional perspective 
prompts scholars to emphasize the electoral benefits political parties gain by presenting policy 
positions that reflect public opinion.  The second perspective is that parties compete by emphasiz-
ing different issues pertaining to domains on which they enjoy issue ownership, in the sense that 
voters associate a focal party with a particular issue which they believe the party can competently 
address.3  This perspective implies that parties may talk past each other, with parties that enjoy 
reputations for wise economic stewardship emphasizing the economy, parties with strong reputa-
tions for fighting crime emphasizing the crime issue, and so on.   
 With respect to positional issue voting, a lively empirical literature investigates whether 
citizens choose parties on the basis of their policy positions or whether parties reciprocally cue 
their pre-existing partisans to adopt the party’s positions.4  To date, however, we are unaware of 
parallel research that evaluates the reciprocal influences of citizens’ party support and their issue 
salience, which are the micro foundation of parties’ issue ownership.  In recent years, the focus 
has shifted to the conditional effect of issue salience, given research that concludes that issue 
ownership only matters to those voters who prioritize the focal issue.5  However, we still do not 
know whether citizens’ issue salience is an exogenous factor that drives their partisanship, or vice 
versa.  That is the question we address here.  Specifically, we analyze German and British panel 
survey data to evaluate the extent to which the salience citizens ascribe to different issue areas 
influenced their subsequent party support – a partisan updating effect – and the extent to which, 
                                                      
2 For example, Downs 1957; Pardos-Prado and Dinas 2010. 
3 Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Green and Hobolt 2008. 
4 Evans and Andersen 2004; Carsey and Layman 2006; Dancey and Goren 2010. 
5 Belanger and Meguid 2008, 479; see also Walgrave et al. 2012; Pardos-Prado et al. 2014. 
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reciprocally, citizens’ party support shaped their subsequent issue priorities, an issue cueing ef-
fect.  
We advance three arguments about the reciprocal relationships between citizens’ issue pri-
orities and their party support.  First, building on previous findings that citizens’ issue saliences 
are more malleable than their issue positions6, we argue that citizens’ issue salience shapes their 
party support and their party support shapes their issue priorities (the reciprocal effects hypothe-
sis).  Second, we argue that the direction of the effects we identify – that, for instance, environ-
mental concerns drive citizens towards green parties but away from the center-right parties that 
prioritize economic growth over environmental protection – are tied to parties’ long-term associa-
tive issue ownership, as reflected in the issues parties emphasize in their election manifestos (the 
associative issue ownership hypothesis).  We thereby tie our research to a debate on whether is-
sue ownership is a competence-based versus an associative dimension.7  Competence-based issue 
ownership is believed to be highly endogenous to partisanship (Petrocik 1996; van der Brug 
2004).  We are testing here whether the same is true for associative issue ownership.  Third, we 
argue for a niche party hypothesis, that mass-elite linkages with respect to citizens’ issue salience 
are far stronger with respect to issue-oriented niche parties, such as the German Greens, than with 
respect to mainstream parties.    
Below we report empirical analyses of German and British panel survey data on citizens’ is-
sue concerns and their party support, which consistently support our hypotheses.  The fact that we 
identify the same individual-level patterns across Germany and Britain – one a multiparty, PR-
based political system that features coalition governments, the other a two-and-a-half-party, plu-
rality-based system that typically features single-party government – suggests that our findings 
may apply generally across Western European electorates.  
                                                      
6 Page and Shapiro 1992. 
7 Walgrave et al. 2012. 
	  
 
4 
Our results have three notable implications.  First, our findings in support of the reciprocal 
effects hypothesis pertain to the argument that parties’ issue ownership affects party support only 
among individuals who prioritize the issue.8  However, we demonstrate that citizens’ issue priori-
ties and their party support reciprocally influence each other.    
Second, our empirical support for the issue ownership hypothesis, that individual-level par-
tisan updating and issue cueing effects reflect the issues that citizens associate with the German 
and British parties – which in turn reflect the issues parties emphasize in their election manifestos 
– illustrates how parties’ associative issue ownership can attract partisan support.  Our study of 
citizens’ reactions to parties’ issue emphases thereby extends earlier manifesto-based studies on 
the electoral effects of parties’ issue positions.9  
Third, our findings in support of the niche party hypothesis extend the remarkable research 
of Meguid and Spoon,10 who conclude that mass-elite linkages involving niche parties – specifi-
cally green and radical right parties – differ from those involving mainstream parties.  Meguid 
and Spoon highlight differences in the types of issues niche parties emphasize, and we extend this 
perspective to show, via our analyses of the German Greens, how citizens’ reactions to the 
Greens’ issue emphases – namely the reciprocal partisan updating and issue cueing effects we 
identify – are far stronger with respect to the Greens then with respect to mainstream parties.  
 
The Reciprocal Relationships between Citizens’  
Issue Salience and their Party Support: Hypotheses 
In the United States, the debate over the reciprocal influences of citizens’ partisanship and their 
issue positions has intensified in recent years.  The conventional wisdom of the 1970s and 1980s 
– that mass partisanship was weakening and was largely driven by other political evaluations, 
                                                      
8 Belanger and Meguid 2008, 477; Walgrave et al. 2012, 773. 
9 Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009.  
10 Meguid 2008; Spoon 2011. 
	  
 
5 
including policy-based considerations11 – has been challenged by research that documents 
strengthening partisan ties.12  Scholars have extended this debate by analyzing the reciprocal in-
fluences of citizens’ issue positions and their partisanship,13 concluding that partisanship influ-
ences American citizens’ issue positions and political values.  By contrast, studies find that Euro-
pean citizens’ partisanship is less central to their self-images than are their issue positions, in par-
ticular that partisanship is more volatile in Europe than in the U.S., which implies that partisan-
ship may not represent a salient identity to Europeans.14  Empirical research by Milazzo and her 
colleagues supports this perspective that European voters are “Downsian” in that their issue posi-
tions influence – but are not influenced by – their party attachments.15 
The studies summarized above support the primacy of European citizens’ issue positions 
vis-à-vis their partisanship.  However one might doubt that citizens’ issue salience unidirectional-
ly moves their partisanship because previous research suggests that citizens’ issue attention (i.e., 
salience) is more malleable than their issue positions.16  Voters’ issue salience is central to issue 
ownership theory, which is an alternative theory of electoral choice beyond spatial models that 
emphasize issue positions.  In particular, Budge and Farlie advance a saliency theory of party 
competition, that political parties selectively emphasize issues on which they enjoy a public im-
age for competence rather than directly engaging with rival parties’ policy positions.17  Issue 
                                                      
11 Page and Jones 1979; Fiorina 1981. 
12 Green et al. 2002; Hetherington 2001. 
13 Goren 2005; Carsey and Layman 2006; Dancey and Goren 2010. 
14 In our argument we use party support, vote intention and partisanship interchangeably.  Conceptually, we 
assume that voting is more volatile than partisanship, even though this might not necessarily be the case in 
Europe (Clarke et al. 2009).  Below we use partisanship in our empirical analysis, which gives us more 
conservative estimates, as it should be less likely to be moved by issue salience than vote choice.  
15 Milazzo et al. 2012. 
16 Page and Shapiro 1992. 
17 Budge and Farlie 1983. See also Klingemann et al. 1994; van der Brug 2004. 
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ownership theory posits that voters support the party that “owns” the issue the voter prioritizes, so 
that – for example – a voter preoccupied with crime will support (all else equal) the party with the 
most positive competence image with respect to law and order.  Extensive research argues that 
citizens’ issue salience shapes their party support,18 which we label a partisan updating effect.   
However, a recent study by Walgrave and his colleagues document that party identification 
constrains citizens’ abilities to receive and accept party messages, which meshes with the argu-
ment that partisanship functions as a perceptual screen.19  Moreover, Hobolt and her colleagues 
document that party leaders’ annual speeches in Denmark and Britain shape the diversity of the 
mass public’s issue priorities, i.e., that political elites in these countries can convey issue-based 
salience cues to rank-and-file voters.20  Based on this research, we expect citizens’ party support 
to reciprocally shape their issue salience, an issue cuing effect.  These considerations motivate our 
first hypothesis: 
 
H1 (The Reciprocal Effects Hypothesis):  Citizens’ issue saliences both influences and is influ-
enced by their partisan affiliations.  
 
Reciprocal effects of issues and partisanship: The case for issue ownership  
The reciprocal effects hypothesis pertains to how citizens’ issue salience affects their party sup-
port, and vice versa.  This link however is moderated by the extent to which different parties 
“own” different issues.  The key to this connection is the nature of issue ownership.  In recent 
years, the focus on competence as a key component of parties’ issue ownership has shifted to a 
second dimension of associative ownership.  Issue competence is defined as “the belief that a par-
ty is best placed to tackle the issue”, whereas associative issue ownership is “the spontaneous as-
sociation between issues and parties in the minds of voters resulting from a history of atten-
                                                      
18 Petrocik 1996; Klingemann et al. 1994; Clarke et al. 2009; Pardos-Prado et al. 2014. 
19Walgrave et al. 2014. See further Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992. 
20 Hobolt et al. 2009. 
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tion”.21  The two concepts differ in that competence-based issue ownership is believed to be en-
dogenous to party identification, i.e., party supporters tend to project positive issue-based compe-
tence evaluations onto their preferred party,22 whereas associative ownership develops from a 
long and persistent history of party attention to a specific issue.  Crucially, Walgrave and his col-
leagues demonstrate that associative issue ownership is not strongly shaped by partisanship, in 
that all parties’ supporters tend to associate the same parties with the same issues.23  The authors 
demonstrate experimentally study that parties cannot “steal” associative issues from another par-
ty, concluding that associative issue ownership “could, more than competence ownership, act as a 
‘filter’ on how parties are perceived”.24  These findings on associative issue ownership recall 
Petrocik’s argument that a persistent history of party attention and commitment toward an issue is 
a prerequisite to becoming an associative issue owner.25  In sum, associative issue ownership is a 
connection citizens make regardless of party preference, which is desirable for testing our recip-
rocal effects hypothesis.  We hence argue that parties’ long-term associative issue ownership 
moderates individual-level partisan updating and issue cueing effects by making information easi-
ly retrievable for voters.  These considerations motivate the hypothesis: 
 
H2 (The Associative Issue Ownership Hypothesis): Citizens’ issue priorities and their party sup-
port reflect parties’ long-term associative issue ownership.   
 
Below we evaluate this hypothesis by analyzing how the individual-level issue cueing and parti-
san updating effects we identify match the issues parties emphasize in their election manifestos.  
 
Reciprocal effects of issues and partisanship: The case for niche parties 
                                                      
21 Walgrave et al. 2012, 779. 
22 Petrocik 1996; van der Brug 2004; Stubager and Slothuus 2013. 
23 Walgrave et al. 2012. 
24 Tresch et al. 2013, 779. 
25 Petrocik 1996, 826. 
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Our third hypothesis pertains to the empirical work of Kitschelt, Tarrow, as well as Adams and 
his collaborators,26 who analyze the attitudes of political elites belonging to niche parties, specifi-
cally small, issue-focused parties such as green and radical right parties, along with the character-
istics of these parties’ rank-and-file supporters.27  These studies find that niche party elites, activ-
ists, and their supporters prioritize issue debates more than do their counterparts from mainstream 
parties, who frequently emphasize their party’s superior competence to govern.  Niche party sup-
porters are also more likely to perceive and react to their preferred party’s policy shifts, and are 
more politically engaged and policy-oriented than mainstream parties’ partisans.  Although these 
studies pertain to positional issues, to the extent that these patterns extend to issue salience they 
imply that mass-elite linkages should be disproportionately strong with respect to niche parties.  
These considerations motivate out third hypothesis: 
 
H3 (The Niche Party Hypothesis): The reciprocal influences of citizens’ issue salience and parti-
sanship is stronger with respect to niche parties than with respect to mainstream parties.  
 
Here we follow Wagner’s definition of niche parties as “parties that compete primarily on 
a small number of non-economic issues”.28  The German Greens – a small party that prioritizes 
the environment – is the only prominent niche party in our two cases, Great Britain and Germa-
ny.29  There is however, comparative evidence that the German Greens might be a useful case 
study, as green parties are considered proto-typical niche parties.30  In the case of Belgium, for 
                                                      
26 Kitschelt 1994; Tarrow 1989; Adams et al. 2006, 2012. 
27 Wagner 2012. 
28 Wagner 2012, 845. 
29 Poguntke 1993. 
30 Meguid 2008; Spoon 2011. 
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example, Walgrave and his colleagues find the strongest associative issue ownership between the 
Green Party and the issue of the environment.31  
 
The German Party System and Issue Emphases  
We evaluate our three hypotheses in the context of German and British politics, for both theoreti-
cal and practical reasons.  Theoretically, Germany is an appropriate setting because it features a 
prominent green party which allows us to evaluate our niche party hypothesis, and moreover the 
multiparty and proportional character of German politics allows us to evaluate issue ownership 
theory outside the majoritarian contexts of the US and Britain, where it has previously been test-
ed.  Practically, Germany and Britain are the only western European polities for which long-term 
panel survey data is available that includes detailed questions about respondents’ issue priorities 
and their party support, which we require in order to test our hypotheses.  This comparison is also 
fortuitous given the differences between the majoritarian, plurality-based British political system 
and the multiparty, PR-based German system, which allow us to parse out the individual-level 
effects that interest us in starkly different political contexts.  
Since the establishment of the West German democratic state in 1949, the German system 
has featured four major parties.  The Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU; hereafter CDU)32 are a 
large, moderate, mainstream party that supports business-friendly, free-market economic policies, 
prioritizes economic growth over environmental protection, emphasizes law and order issues, and 
presents conservative positions on social issues along with a skeptical attitude towards immigra-
tion and multiculturalism.33  The Free Democrats (FDP) are a smaller market-liberal party which, 
like the CDU, advocates pro-business policies and which served as a junior partner in coalition 
                                                      
31 Walgrave et al. 2012, 775; see also Tresch et al. 2013. 
32 The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) can be considered one party, 
also forming one faction in parliament.  The latter competes in the federal state of Bavaria.  Hereafter we only 
refer to the CDU, which includes CSU partisans.   
33 See, e.g. Pardos-Pardo et al. 2014. 
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government with the CDU between 1949-1957, 1961-1966, 1982-1998, and 2009-2013.  The ma-
jor differences between the FDP and the CDU are that the FDP is even more strongly pro-
business than the CDU, while de-emphasizing law and order, multiculturalism, and social issues. 
The two major leftist German parties over the past thirty years are the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) and the Greens, who formed an alternative leftist governing coalition between 1998 
and 2005.  The SPD is a large, moderate, center-left party that typically supports expanding social 
welfare programs, that takes a mixed position on the trade-off between prioritizing the economy 
versus the environment,34 and that de-emphasizes law and order issues compared to its right-wing 
competitors.  The Greens, meanwhile, are a prototypical niche party that predominantly empha-
sizes environmental issues, and that also takes more positive stances on multiculturalism than do 
the mainstream parties.   
 
Associative issue ownership and parties’ election manifestos 
In order to test our Associative Issue Ownership Hypothesis (H2) we follow the measurement 
strategies of Budge and Farlie as well as Walgrave and De Swert, who use content analysis of 
parties’ election manifestos to assess parties’ differential attention to various issue areas.35  There 
are several reasons to believe that parties’ manifestos capture their long-term issue emphases.  
First, the lengthy intra-party discussions and consultations involved in composing these docu-
ments, along with the extensive media coverage of manifestos, testify to their central role in na-
tional election campaigns.36  In addition, Adams and his colleagues report interviews with party 
elites from Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria, in which these politicians consistently assert 
that their party makes determined efforts to campaign based on its election manifesto, while 
Baumgartner and his team report that the issues parties prioritize in their manifestos correlate 
with the issue domains they prioritize in other venues including parliamentary debates, legislative 
                                                      
34 Benoit and Laver 2006. 
35 Budge and Farlie 1983; Walgrave and De Swert 2007. 
36 Budge et al. 2001. 
	  
 
11 
behavior, and government budgets.37  We therefore expect these documents to roughly capture 
parties’ long-term associative issue ownership. 
Figure	  1:	  Proportions	  of	  the	  German	  Parties’	  Election	  
Manifestos	  Devoted	  to	  Four	  Policy	  Issues,	  1983-­‐2009	  
	  
	  
Notes:	  	  The	  figures	  display	  the	  proportions	  of	  quasi-­‐sentences	  in	  each	  German	  political	  party’s	  election	  mani-­‐
festo	  that	  pertained	  to	  four	  different	  political	  issues,	  as	  coded	  by	  the	  Comparative	  Manifesto	  Project,	  for	  each	  
election	  manifesto	  published	  between	  1983	  and	  2009.	  
 
Figure 1 displays data collected by the Comparative Manifesto Project38 (CMP), which plots 
the proportions of quasi-sentences in each German party’s election manifesto devoted to econom-
                                                      
37 Adams et al. 2011; Baumgartner et al. 2009. 
38 The updated data available at https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ was used for these analyses.  To measure eco-
nomic salience, we add the CMP items 401-416, which measure diverse aspects of the national economy such 
as free market economics, economy planning, and economic growth.  Environmental saliency is measured us-
ing CMP item 501, which includes positive mentions of environmental protection.  CMP item 605 is used to 
measure positive mentions of law and order.  The sum of CMP items 601 (National Way of Life: Positive) and 
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ic issues (Figure 1A), the environment (Figure 1B), law and order (Figure 1C), and the sum of the 
party’s negative references to multiculturalism and their positive references to the national way of 
life, which appear relevant to immigration issues39 (Figure 1D) over each election held between 
1983 and 2009, the time period covered in the individual-level analyses presented below.  Based 
on the long-term issue emphasis trends displayed in the figures, the associative issue owner of our 
four analyzed issues are the following:  For the economy, Figure 1A documents that the three 
mainstream parties all emphasized economic issues, i.e., there is no clear issue owner on the 
economy but the Greens are the clear associative issue “loser”.  Regarding the environment, the 
patterns in Figure 1B confirm that – as expected – the Greens are the associative issue owner, 
emphasizing this issue more than 50 per cent more than any mainstream party.  Figures 1C and 
1D document that the CDU disproportionately emphasized law and order issues while making 
more negative references to multiculturalism (and positive references to the national way of life) 
than the other parties, so that the CDU appears as the associative issue owner of law and order 
and immigration.  These patterns across the different issue domains comport well with experts’ 
understanding of German parties’ long-term issue emphases.40  We expect German citizens’ issue 
salience and partisanship linkages to reflect the associative issue ownership patterns implied by 
the German parties’ long-term issue emphases. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
608 (Multiculturalism: Negative) is our measure of the saliency of anti-immigrant sentiments.  We follow Par-
dos-Prado et al. (2013) in conceptualizing immigration as an issue salience rather than a positional issue. 
39 We note that the Comparative Manifesto Project codings do not include codings of immigration, which is why 
we analyze codings for multiculturalism and national way of life. 
40 For instance these codings are consistent with surveys conducted by Benoit and Laver (2006), where political 
experts were asked to evaluate the relative emphases that parties placed on environmental protection versus 
economic growth. 
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Empirical Analysis 
We evaluate our hypotheses via analyses of data from a unique 26-wave German panel study, the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which tracks citizens’ party support and issue salience 
between 1984 and 2009 through annual face-to-face interviews.41  We analyze 19,777 respond-
ents with at least three observations on the party support and issue priority variables, the mini-
mum number required to estimate our models.42  We conducted supplementary analyses using 
higher cut-off points, which supported substantive conclusions identical to those we report below.   
The key variables in our analyses pertain to respondents’ partisanship and issue salience.  
The partisanship question reads: “Many people in Germany are inclined to a certain political par-
ty, although from time to time they vote for another political party.  What about you: Are you in-
clined – generally speaking – to a particular party?”  Those who responded, ‘Yes’, were then 
asked, ‘Which one?’ and handed a card that listed all the parties.  Those giving ‘no answer’ or 
‘don’t know’ were set to missing.  The dependent variable was measured by distinguishing the 
supporters of the four major parties – the SPD, CDU, FDP, and the Greens – from independents 
and partisans of smaller parties.  
Issue salience was measured by the degree of concern respondents expressed with respect to 
a series of issues.  The question wording was: “What about the following areas: Are you con-
cerned about them? ... 1. Very concerned; 2. Somewhat concerned; 3. Not concerned at all”. 43  
                                                      
41 For more information on the GSOEP contents and structure see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005) and Wag-
ner et al. (2007).  The study contains various samples, such as separate Eastern German and refreshment sam-
ples; however we limit our analysis to West German citizens.  We exclude East Germans and immigrants as 
the nature of partisanship and political attitudes differs for these groups due to different socialization experi-
ences (Neundorf 2009; Kroh 2014). 
42 We restrict our analyses to respondents with at least three valid responses, as this provides at least two chang-
es in reported attitudes and/or partisanship per person, which is necessary to correctly identify the reciprocal 
issue cueing and partisan updating effects that interest us.  For more information see Neundorf et al. (2011).  
43 The question wording in German is as follows: “Wie ist es mit den folgenden Gebieten - machen Sie sich da 
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We believe that the statement that somebody is “very concerned” denotes that the respondent pri-
oritizes the issue, and we dichotomize the issue concern variable accordingly.44  We analyzed re-
spondents’ concerns over environmental protection, general economic development, crime, and 
immigration; the latter issue is plausibly related to concerns over multiculturalism and the nation-
al way of life, the relevant issue domains that are included in the CMP codings.45  The issue sali-
ence questions pertaining to the economy and the environment were asked across all 26 waves of 
the 1984-2009 GSOEP survey, and those pertaining to crime and immigration were asked be-
tween 1999 and 2009.   
 
Exploring citizens’ issue salience  
Table 1 reports the proportions of respondents who expressed concerns over the four issue areas, 
stratified by party support.  We see that partisans’ issue concerns reflected their preferred party’s 
manifesto-based emphases, in that the proportion of Green supporters who expressed environ-
mental concerns (62 per cent) far exceeded the corresponding proportions for mainstream parties’ 
supporters and for independents (none of these groups exceeded 43 per cent), while Green parti-
sans expressed far less concern over the economy, crime, and immigration than did other re-
spondents.  This supports the view of the Greens as a single-issue niche party associated with the 
environment.  In addition, consistent with the CDU’s manifesto-based emphases, CDU supporters 
expressed the most concerns over both crime and immigration.   
                                                                                                                                                                        
Sorgen? 1. Grosse Sorgen, 2. Einige Sorgen, 3. Keine Sorgen.”  We note that an alternative approach to the 
study of citizens’ issue salience relies on survey responses to qiestions about citizens’ perceptions of the most 
important problem.  See Wlezien (2005) for a discussion of this issue. 
44 Petrocik 1996: 826; Pardos-Prado et al. 2014. 
45 The issues are moderately correlated at 0.14 (environment and immigration) to 0.30 (economy and crime).  
However, because immigration and crime are correlated at 0.50 we estimated separate models for each issue to 
avoid multi-collinearity issues.  However we also estimated models including all issues simultaneously, and 
these estimates supported substantive conclusions that were identical to those we report below.    
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Table	  1:	  German	  Partisanship	  and	  Issue	  Salience	  (in	  per	  cent)	  
	  
	  	   Concern	  with…	  
Party	  ID	   Nat.	  	  Economy	   Environment	   Crime	   Immigration	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Independent	  or	  other	  Party	  (49%)	   32.6	   35.1	   46.3	   31.0	  
SPD	  -­‐	  Social	  Democrat	  (21%)	   33.8	   42.9	   45.6	   25.5	  
CDU/CSU	  -­‐	  Christian	  Union	  (23%)	   33.0	   30.9	   49.6	   34.6	  
FDP	  -­‐	  The	  Liberals	  (3%)	   31.5	   31.9	   34.7	   23.0	  
The	  Greens	  (5%)	   25.3	   62.2	   21.6	   6.3	  
Total	   32.6	   37.1	   45.4	   29.2	  
Notes:	  The	  table	  reports	  the	  proportions	  of	  partisans	  (and	  independents)	  who	  stated	  that	  they	  were	  con-­‐
cerned	  about	  each	  issue.	  	  The	  percentages	  are	  computed	  over	  the	  set	  of	  14,912	  respondents	  who	  gave	  valid	  
responses	  in	  at	  least	  three	  waves	  of	  the	  German	  Socio-­‐Economic	  Panel	  (GSOEP)	  that	  tracked	  respondents’	  par-­‐
ty	  support	  and	  issue	  priorities	  between	  1999	  and	  2009.	  	  The	  GSOEP	  questions	  relating	  to	  respondents’	  issue	  
priorities	  and	  their	  party	  support	  are	  given	  in	  the	  text.	  	  Of	  the	  49	  per	  cent	  of	  respondents	  that	  are	  grouped	  as	  
independent,	  2.3	  per	  cent	  identified	  with	  smaller	  parties.	  
 
 
Statistical specifications using cross-lagged Markov Chain models 
While the figures in Table 1 are suggestive, they do not allow us test the causal order of issue sa-
lience and partisanship.  Do citizens take issue priority cues from their preferred party, or do citi-
zens’ party evaluations drive their pre-existing issue priorities?  Moreover, how do these links 
connect to the issues each party emphasizes in its election manifestos?  To evaluate these effects 
we model the dynamics of GSOEP respondents’ party support and issue salience using cross-
lagged Markov Chain modeling, which allows the consideration of autocorrelation in repeated 
observations as well as the inclusion of lagged time-varying effects of issue salience on partisan-
ship, and vice versa.  Markov models employ a first-order markovian structure allowing sequenc-
es of individual observations to be correlated, and recent studies by Clarke and McCutcheon as 
well as Neundorf and her colleagues demonstrate that Markov models correctly specify the dy-
namics of individual-level partisanship. 46  
                                                      
46 Clarke and McCutcheon 2009; Neundorf, Stegmueller and Scotto 2011. 
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Specifying the impact of respondents’ lagged issue salience on their current partisanship (parti-
san updating effects).  We model party support via a series of multinomial logit equations.  Spe-
cifically, the probability that a respondent i states that she is a partisan of party k at time t, relative 
to the probability that i is classified as an independent, is estimated as a function of overall inter-
cepts, i’s reported partisanship at the previous panel wave at time t – 1 (the effect of which is al-
lowed to vary across time47), and i’s expressed concerns with the economy, the environment, 
crime, or immigration at time (t – 1).  We estimated four different models to include one issue at 
a time.  In the case of West Germany, which features four major parties and the example of envi-
ronmental concerns, this model is specified as follows:48 
 
     ,     (1) 
     ,    (2) 
     ,    (3) 
      .   (4) 
                                                      
47 We estimate time-varying effects because party support is influenced by time-specific events such as political 
scandals and crises that influence parties’ popular appeal.  For instance in 1999 the German media exposed the 
illegal campaign donations that the CDU had previously accepted under the leadership of Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl, a story line that badly damaged the CDU’s image (Pappi et al. 2004).   
48 The Baum-Welch algorithm implemented in the Syntax version of LatentGOLD (Vermunt and Magidson 
2008) was used to handle the large number of cases in our panel study.  25 start sets per model were estimated.  
The final set of parameters were estimated after 1000 EM iterations using the Newton’s methods.   
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In equation 1  are stability coefficients which denote how i’s lagged 
partisanship affects her current likelihood of supporting the Greens (relative to her likelihood of 
being independent), where ,   are dummy 
variables which equal one if i supported the focal party at time (t – 1) and zero otherwise.  Of 
course we expect that respondents who supported the Greens at time (t – 1) are likely to support 
the Greens at time t, i.e., we expect a positive coefficient estimate on .  Note that we also es-
timate effects on Green Party support of respondents’ lagged support for the SPD, CDU, and 
FDP, to evaluate whether different parties’ elites provide differing cues with respect to the 
Greens.  For instance we might expect SPD elites to cue their supporters to positively evaluate the 
Greens, given these parties’ history of collaboration in national government.   
The coefficient  in equation 1 denotes the impact of i’s lagged environmental concerns 
– represented by the dummy variable environmenti(t – 1) – on i’s partisanship at time t.  A posi-
tive (negative) cross-lagged coefficient estimate on  denotes that i’s lagged environmental 
concerns enhance (depress) her likelihood of currently supporting the Greens, which would be 
evidence of a partisan updating effect with respect to the Greens.   
 
Specifying the impact of respondents’ lagged partisanship on their current issue salience (issue 
cueing effects).  We specify the probability that a respondent prioritizes a focal issue at time t as a 
function of overall intercepts, her lagged issue salience at time (t – 1) as time-varying period ef-
fects, and her lagged partisanship.  Below we present the specification for citizens’ environmental 
salience; the specifications for the remaining issues (the economy, crime, and immigration) dis-
play the same functional form: 
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In equation 5,  is a stability coefficient that influences respondents’ environmental concerns49 
while the cross-lagged coefficients  capture the partisan updating effects of lagged 
partisanship.  Thus a positive estimate on , the coefficient on the Greensi(t – 1) variable, will 
denote that respondents who supported the Greens at time (t – 1) were more likely to express en-
vironmental concerns at time t, when controlling for lagged environmental concerns – an estimate 
that would imply that the Greens cue their supporters to prioritize the environment.  The coeffi-
cients  represent parallel estimates of environmental cues associated with lagged sup-
port for the SPD, CDU, and FDP.   
 
Control variables on partisanship and issue salience.  Our specifications included individual-level 
covariates to capture factors that affected respondents’ partisanship and issue salience when they 
first entered the panel.50  We expect education, occupation, age, gender, church attendance and 
political interest to affect respondents’ initial partisanship and issue salience.  For example, our 
estimates – reported in supplementary materials – imply that politically interested respondents 
were more likely to be partisans and to prioritize political issues.     
 
Results 
The reciprocal impact of issue salience and partisanship   
 
The upper panels (grey bars) of Figures 2A-2D display the estimated logit coefficients for equa-
tions 1-5 above, along with the 95 per cent confidence intervals on these estimates.51  The dark-
grey bars represent partisan updating effects of respondents’ lagged issue salience on their cur-
                                                      
49 Such time-specific effects include events such as environmental disasters (such as the Chernobyl nuclear ac-
cident), which depress or enhance respondents’ environmental concerns independently of their partisanship.   
50 Neundorf, Stegmueller and Scotto 2011. 
51 We report the table including the numeric expression of these coefficients in the Appendix Table A1. 
t1α
5432 ,,, αααα
2α
543 ,, ααα
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rent party support for the four issue areas we analyze, while the light-grey bars display the coeffi-
cients of lagged partisanship on current issue priorities, i.e., issue cueing effects.  
The results displayed in the upper panels of Figures 2A-2D support the Reciprocal Effects 
Hypothesis (H1), that citizens’ issue salience both influences and is influenced by their party 
support.  The estimates in Figure 2B denote that, holding lagged partisanship constant, 
respondents with lagged environmental concerns were more likely to support the Greens and the 
SPD – and less likely to support the CDU and the FDP – at the current panel, i.e., the coefficients 
on lagged environmental concerns are positive for the Greens and the SPD and negative for the 
CDU and the FDP (p < .01 in all cases).  Reciprocally, we estimate that lagged support for the 
Greens and the SPD cued respondents to prioritize the environment at the current panel, while 
lagged CDU and FDP support cued respondents to de-emphasize this issue (p < .01).  With 
respect to the economy (Figure 2A) we estimate that lagged support for the CDU and the SPD 
cued respondents to prioritize this issue at the current panel, while lagged Green support cued 
respondents to de-emphasize the economy (p < .01 in all cases).  Finally, Figures 2C-2D display 
estimates that lagged crime and immigration concerns prompted respondents to support the CDU 
but to withdraw support from the FDP, the SPD, and the Greens at the current panel wave (p < 
.01), and, reciprocally, that respondents who reported lagged support for the FDP, SPD, and the 
Greens de-emphasized these issues at the current panel (p < .01).  These estimates support the 
Reciprocal Effects Hypothesis (H1). 
The results displayed in Figures 2A-2D also suggest that issue cuing effects were general-
ly larger than partisan updating effects.  We see that especially for the Green Party, Green parti-
sanship strongly cues voters to prioritize the environment while de-emphasizing  the economy, 
crime, and immigration, which supports the Greens’ profile as a single-issue niche party.  We al-
so estimate stronger issue cuing effects for SPD supporters for the issues of the economy and the 
environment, compared to the reciprocal partisan updating estimates.52   
                                                      
52 In supplementary materials we further report the model fit, calculated as the difference in AIC between the 
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Figure	  2:	  Comparing	  Averaged	  German	  Parties’	  
Manifestos	  (1983-­‐2009)	  and	  Estimated	  Cross-­‐Lagged	  Effects	  
	  
	   	  
	  
	  
Notes:	  The	  upper	  figures	  (grey	  bars)	  display	  the	  estimated	  cross-­‐lagged	  logit	  coefficients	  and	  the	  correspond-­‐
ing	  95	  per	  cent	  confidence	  intervals.	  	  The	  dark	  grey-­‐bars	  in	  Figure	  2A-­‐D	  display	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  partisan	  
updating	  effects	  (DV=partisanship)	  and	  are	  based	  on	  a	  mulitnomial	  logistic	  regressions	  where	  the	  base	  
category	  is	  no	  or	  other	  party	  identification	  (see	  equations	  1-­‐4	  in	  the	  text).	  	  The	  light	  grey-­‐bars	  display	  the	  
estimates	  of	  the	  issue	  cueing	  effects	  (DV=issue	  saliency)	  and	  are	  based	  on	  a	  logistic	  regression	  in	  which	  the	  
                                                                                                                                                                        
model excluding a cross-lagged effect of issue saliency (at t-1) on partisanship and vice versa, and the model 
including these cross-lagged coefficients.  The models including partisanship when predicting issue saliency 
clearly outperform the improvement of the model compared to the prediction of the partisan updating effect.   
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base	  category	  is	  not	  being	  concerned	  with	  the	  focal	  issue	  (see	  equation	  5	  in	  the	  text).	  	  The	  lower	  figures	  (black	  
bars)	  display	  the	  average	  proportion	  of	  quasi-­‐sentences	  in	  party	  manifestos	  measured	  by	  the	  CMP	  devoted	  to	  
the	  issue.	  
 
The question arises: Can we infer causal relationships from our statistical estimates, i.e., 
that citizens’ party support and issue saliences reciprocally influence each other?  We see strong 
reasons to infer such causal effects.  With respect to issue cueing, we uncover strong associations 
between survey respondents’ lagged party support and their current issue salience, even when 
controlling for respondents’ lagged party support.  Given our theoretical reasons to expect citi-
zens to take issue-based cues from parties, and given that we also control for respondents’ educa-
tion, occupation, age, gender, church attendance, and political interest – factors that might jointly 
influence citizens’ issue priorities and their party support – we infer that citizens’ party support 
indeed influences their issue salience.  This inference is strengthened by the empirical analyses 
we report below, which directly link the individual-level issue cueing processes we estimate to 
parties’ associative issue ownership, as measured by their manifesto-based issue emphasis.   
 
Linking individual-level issue effects to parties’ issue ownership 
Next, we evaluate whether the issue-based effects we estimate reflect parties’ associative issue 
ownership as exhibited in their election manifestos.  The lower panels of Figures 2A-2D display 
the parties’ long-term issue emphases, averaged over the period 1983-2009, based on the CMP 
manifesto codings presented earlier in Figure 1.  These party-level issue emphases strongly corre-
late with the individual-level partisan updating and issue cueing effects we estimate from the 
German panel data.53  For example the Greens, followed by the SPD, most strongly emphasized 
                                                      
53 We note that in analyzing the links between parties’ manifesto-based issue emphases averaged over the entire 
period (1983-2009) of the GSOEP panel study, and our individual-level estimates of partisan updating and 
issue cueing effects averaged over this period, we are evaluating the long-term linkages between parties’ issue 
emphases and these individual-level processes.  An alternative approach is to analyze whether citizens respond 
to short-term fluctuations in parties’ issue emphases; however this would require a different modelling 
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environmental issues in their manifestos across the 1983-2009 period (see the lower panel of Fig-
ure 2B), and we estimate positive individual-level partisan updating and issue cueing effects on 
this issue with respect to these two parties, i.e., that lagged environmental concerns enhance citi-
zens’ support for the Greens and the FDP, and that lagged support for these parties reciprocally 
cues citizens to prioritize the environment.  Meanwhile we estimate negative partisan updating 
and issue cueing effects on the environment with respect to the CDU and the FDP, the two parties 
that de-emphasize this issue (see the lower panel of Figure 2B).  Overall, the correlation between 
the parties’ manifesto-based environmental emphases and our estimates of individual-level parti-
san updating effects for each party is 0.98 (p = .001).54  These strong associations extend to the 
remaining issues: The CDU places the strongest manifesto-based emphasis on crime and immi-
gration (see the bottom panels of Figures 2C-2D), and it is the only party for which we estimate 
positive individual-level partisan updating and issue cueing effects on these issues, while we es-
timate strongly negative individual-level effects with respect to the Greens, the party which de-
votes the least attention to these issues.  The correlation between the parties’ manifesto-based 
crime emphases and our estimates of individual-level partisan updating effects is 0.90 (p = .001), 
                                                                                                                                                                        
strategy, as we could not incorporate the manifesto measures in the cross-lagged models.  We hope to address 
short-term effects in subsequent research, although this will require extending our measure of parties’ issue 
emphases beyond manifesto codings, since parties only publish these manifestos during election years (while 
our panel data contains yearly waves).  We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. 
54 That is, the percentage of each party’s manifesto that addressed environmental issues, averaged over the 
period 1983-2009, was 14.5% for the Greens, 10.0% for the SPD, 6.6% for the CDU, and 8.8% for the FDP 
(see the lower panel of Figure 2B), while our coefficient estimates on issue cueing effects with respect to the 
environment, pictured in the upper panel of Figure 2B, are 0.96 for the Greens, 0.20 for the SPD, -0.19 for the 
CDU, and -0.12 for the FDP.  The correlation between the parties’ manifesto-based issue emphases and the 
issue cueing effects that we estimated from the GSOEP panel data is 0.98 (p < .01).  All of the additional 
correlations we report below, on the associations between parties’ manifesto-based issue emphases and the 
individual-level issue cueing and partisan updating effects, are computed on this basis.  
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while the correlation between the parties’ crime emphases and our estimates of individual-level 
issue cueing effects on this issue is 0.94 (p = .001); and, the correlations on the immigration issue 
are 0.74 (p = .001) for individual-level partisan updating effects, and 0.75 (p = .001) for issue cue-
ing effects.  Finally, the correlation between the parties’ manifesto-based economic emphases and 
our estimates of individual-level partisan updating effects is 0.71 (p = .01) and the correlation be-
tween the parties’ manifesto-based economic emphases and our estimated issue cueing effects is 
0.63 (p = .01).  These strong links support the Associative Issue Ownership Hypothesis (H2), that 
citizens’ issue salience and the partisanship reflect parties’ long-term associative issue ownership. 
 
Issue salience, partisanship and the niche party hypothesis  
 
The estimates displayed in Figure 2 also support the Niche Party Hypothesis (H3), that 
individual-level partisan updating and issue cueing effects are far stronger with respect to the 
Greens than for mainstream parties.  Specifically, for all four issue areas that we analyze the 
coefficient estimates on the Greens – with respect to both partisan updating and issue cueing – are 
over three times the magnitudes of the estimates on any mainstream party.  (In all cases the 
differences between the estimates on the Greens versus mainstream parties are statistically 
significant, p < .01.)  This striking difference suggests that mass-elite linkages involving the 
Greens differ fundamentally from those involving the mainstream parties.  Simply put, German 
citizens’ issue priorities strongly influence – and are influenced by – their support for the Greens, 
while the parallel effects with respect to mainstream parties are modest.  And, we emphasize that 
this pattern extends to every issue we examine, not only the environment where we find – as 
expected – that environmental concerns push citizens towards the Greens (and vice versa): we 
also estimate that lagged concerns over the economy, crime and immigration drive citizens 
sharply away from the Greens – to a much greater extant than such concerns push citizens 
towards (or away from) any mainstream party – and that lagged Green Party support sharply 
depresses respondents’ likelihoods of prioritizing these issues.   
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Illustrating the reciprocal effect of partisanship and issue salience 
 
Figure 3 displays the impact of partisan updating on the ability for political parties to attract  
new supporters from one panel wave to the next, an effect we label partisan-inflow.  Figure 3 dis-
plays the predicted probabilityies that lagged independents, i.e., respondents who self-identified as 
independents at the previous panel wave, would switch their partisanship to each party at the current 
wave, stratified by the respondent’s lagged concerns over the economy (Figure A), the environment 
(Figure B), crime (Figure C) and immigration (Figure D).  The figure shows that the Green Party 
significantly boosts their partisan inflow among respondents who reported lagged environmental 
concerns (see Figure 3B), while lagged independents’ concerns about the economy, crime and 
immigration substantially depress these respondents’ likelihoods of switching their support to the 
Greens at the current panel (see Figures 3A, 3C, and 3D).  Meanwhile, the partisan updating processes 
are precisely the opposite with respect to the CDU, in that independents’ lagged concerns over the 
environment substantially depress theses respondents’ probabilities of switching to the CDU at the 
current panel wave, while lagged concerns over the remaining issues enhance the likelihood that a 
lagged indeopendent will switch her support to the CDU.    
 
Figure	  3:	  Predicted	  Partisan	  Inflow	  as	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Function	  of	  Respondents’	  Lagged	  Issue	  Salience	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Notes:	  This	  Figure	  displays	  the	  computed	  partisanship	  inflow	  (incl.	  95	  per	  cent	  confidence	  intervals),	  stratified	  by	  
lagged	  issue	  salience.	  	  These	  computations	  are	  based	  on	  the	  parameter	  estimates	  reported	  in	  Figure	  2.	  	  
	  
 
 
Our estimates on the electoral effects of parties’ issue emphases – for both the main-
stream German parties and the niche Green party – are of comparable magnitudes to the electoral 
effects of their issue positions, as estimated in previous research.  In particular, previous research 
by Adams and his colleagues suggests that realistic changes in European parties’ left-right issue 
positions only moderately influence citizens’ party support.55  While our estimates on the elec-
toral effects of German parties’ issue emphases are not trivial – given that a vote share shift of 
two or three percentage points can easily shift the balance of power between rival proto-coalitions 
of German parties – the modest magnitudes of these estimates underline the fact that national 
election outcomes in Germany (and elsewhere) turn on many factors besides the parties’ issue 
emphases, including their issue positions; national economic conditions; short-term political cri-
ses and scandals; party leaders’ images; and the effectiveness with which parties communicate 
their messages during election campaigns. 
 
 
	  
                                                      
55 Adams et al. 2006; see also Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009. 
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Figure	  4:	  Predicted	  Issue	  Salience	  Inflow	  as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Function	  of	  Respondents’	  Lagged	  Partisanship	  
	  
	   	  
	   	  
Notes:	  This	  Figure	  displays	  the	  computed	  issue	  salience	  inflow	  (incl.	  95	  per	  cent	  confidence	  intervals),	  stratified	  
by	  lagged	  partisanship.	   	  These	  computations	  are	  based	  on	  the	  parameter	  estimates	  reported	  in	  Figure	  2,	  of	  the	  
effects	  of	  lagged	  partisanship	  on	  GSOEP	  respondents’	   issue	  salience.	  	  The	  vertical	   lines	  correspond	  to	  the	  mean	  
issue	  salience	  inflow	  among	  independents.	  	  
	  
 
Figure 4 displays the substantive impact of our estimated issue cueing effects, by plotting 
the computed probabilities that respondents who did not prioritize the focal issue (the economy, 
the environment, crime, or immigration) at the previous panel wave would prioritize this issue at 
the current wave, as a function of lagged partisanship.  Consistent with the niche party hypothe-
sis, we see that lagged Green Party support strongly cued respondents’ current issue priorities.  
Figure 4B displays results that among respondents who did not report lagged environmental con-
cerns, those who were political independents at the previous panel had a computed 22.2 per cent 
probability of prioritizing the environment at the current panel wave, while for lagged Green Par-
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ty supporters this computed probability jumped to 41.3 per cent, nearly double that for independ-
ents.  The Figure also displays how strongly the Greens cued their supporters to de-emphasize 
other issue areas: Figures 4A, 4C, and 4D display computations that among respondents who did 
not prioritize the economy, crime, and immigration at the previous panel wave, lagged independ-
ents had computed probabilities of 21.1 per cent, 23.8 per cent, and 16.4 per cent, respectively, of 
prioritizing these issues at the current panel, while lagged Green Party supporters’ probabilities of 
prioritizing these issues were only 16.4 per cent, 11.3 per cent, and 4.3 per cent.  These estimates 
imply that the Green Party strongly cued its supporters’ attention towards the environment, and 
away from all other issues.  This suggests that the dramatic differences in Green Party supporters’ 
issue priorities vis-à-vis mainstream partisans’ priorities, presented earlier in Table 1, reflect in 
part Green Party elites’ abilities to shape their supporters’ issue priorities.   
Figures 4A-4D also display computations on the mainstream parties’ (more modest) abili-
ties to shape their supporters’ issue salience.  On crime and immigration, Figures 4C-4D illustrate 
that lagged support for the CDU – the party that most strongly highlighted these issue in its mani-
festos – increased respondents’ likelihoods of prioritizing crime and immigration at the current 
panel wave by two to four percentage points (compared to lagged independence), while lagged 
support for the SPD and the FDP decreased respondents’ likelihoods of prioritizing these issues 
by two to six percentage points.  With respect to the environment, Figure 4B illustrates that 
lagged support for the SPD – which emphasized environmental issues more strongly than the 
CDU and FDP (see the bottom panel of Figure 2D) – increased respondents’ likelihood of priori-
tizing the environment by about three percentage points, while lagged CDU and FDP support de-
pressed the likelihood of subsequent environmental concerns by two to three percentage points.   
 
Robustness checks 
We conducted several analyses to assess the robustness of our conclusions, which we report in 
the supplementary materials appendix.  First, we analyzed whether our findings varied depending 
on which parties were currently in the national governing coalition, and we also estimated the 
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parameters of specifications with longer time lags for the reciprocal relationships modeled in the 
paper, compared to the one-year lags specified above.  In addition, to investigate the effects of 
possible measurement error we replicated our models while specifying partisanship as a latent 
variable.  These analyses continue to support our substantive conclusions: we found that mass-
elite linkages varied only modestly depending on the governing coalition, and our conclusions are 
robust to specifications with longer time lags and those that account for measurement error.  
 
British Issue Ownership and Citizens’ Partisanship-Issue Saliency Linkage 
We extend our study of mass-elite issue linkages to Britain by analyzing data from the British 
Household Panel Study (BHPS), an annual survey of British households that began in 1991.56  
We investigate two issue areas covered in the BHPS that parallel the issues we analyzed for Ger-
many.  Between 1992-1996 the BHPS included a battery of questions three times asking respond-
ents how much they were concerned about “unemployment” (welfare) and “the destruction of the 
ozone layer” (environment).  Respondents could answer: 1. A great deal; 2. Fair amount; 3. Not 
very much; and 4. Not at all.  We ascribed issue salience to those who expressed a great deal of 
concern with these issues (Response 1).57  
The three major British parties during the 1992-1996 period of our study were the Conserva-
tives, Labour, and the smaller Liberal Democrats.  We distinguish the partisans of these parties 
from independents and smaller parties’ supporters (only 1.3 per cent of BHPS respondents identi-
fied with any other party across 1992-96).58  Table 2 reports the proportions of respondents who 
                                                      
56 More information on the BHPS is available at: http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/survey/bhps. 
57 We have re-estimated our models while classifying response categories 1-2 as issue salience, and these 
analyses support substantive conclusions that are identical to those we report below. 
58 In each BHPS survey wave, respondents receive the following questions pertaining to partisanship: “General-
ly speaking, do you think of yourself as a supporter of any one political party?”  Respondents who answer 
“yes” are asked “which one.”  Respondents who answer “no” are asked if they think of themselves as “a little 
closer to one political party than to the others.”  We consider BHPS respondents as partisans if they responded 
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stated that they were concerned with each of the issue areas listed above, stratified by party sup-
port.  The patterns displayed in this table match the parties’ long-term issue emphases (discussed 
below): Labour partisans expressed the most concerns about unemployment, while Liberal Dem-
ocrats expressed the most concern about the environment.  
Table	  2:	  British	  Partisanship	  and	  Issue	  Saliency	  (in	  per	  cent)	  
	  
	   Concern	  with….	  
Party	  ID	   Unemployment	   Environment	  (Ozone	  layer)	  
None/other	  PID	  (32%)	   53.7	   39.1	  
Conservatives	  (29%)	   48.5	   38.0	  
Labour	  (30%)	   74.2	   44.1	  
Lib	  Dems	  (9%)	   65.6	   49.2	  
Total	   59.5	   41.2	  
Notes:	  The	  table	  reports	  the	  proportions	  of	  partisans	  and	  independents	  who	  stated	  that	  they	  were	  concerned	  
about	  each	  issue.	  	  The	  wordings	  and	  codings	  of	  the	  issue	  concern	  and	  the	  party	  support	  questions	  are	  given	  in	  
the	  text.	  	  Data:	  British	  Household	  Panel	  Study,	  1991-­‐1996.	  
 
To evaluate the reciprocal linkages between British citizens’ party support and their issue sa-
lience, we estimated the same types of cross-lagged Markov Chain models that we applied to the 
German panel data.  To estimate partisan updating effects, we specified respondents’ party 
support via a series of multinomial logit equations that parallel equations 1-4 above: namely, the 
independent variables included the respondent’s lagged partisanship and lagged concern about the 
focal issue (unemployment or the environment).59  And, to estimate issue cueing effects we 
specified respondents’ issue salience via a series of multinomial logit equations that parallel 
equation 5 above, where the dependent variable was the respondent’s expressed concern over the 
focal issue area, and the key independent variables included the respondent’s lagged concern over 
this issue and lagged partisanship.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
“yes” to either question.   
59 These models also included the following control variables on the respondent’s initial partisanship and issue 
salience: age, home ownership, education, region, and political interest.  
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Figure	  5:	  Comparing	  Estimated	  Cross-­‐Lagged	  Effects	  	  
and	  Averaged	  British	  Parties’	  Manifestos	  (1992-­‐1996)	  
	  
	   	  
Notes:	  The	  upper	  figures	  (grey	  bars)	  display	  the	  estimated	  cross-­‐lagged	  logit	  coefficients	  and	  the	  
corresponding	  95	  per	  cent	  confidence	  interval.	  	  The	  dark	  grey-­‐bars	  display	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  partisan	  
updating	  effects	  and	  are	  based	  on	  a	  mulitnomial	  logistic	  regression	  where	  the	  base	  category	  is	  no	  or	  other	  
party	  identification.	  	  The	  light	  grey-­‐bars	  display	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  issue	  cueing	  effects	  and	  are	  based	  on	  a	  
logistic	  regression	  in	  which	  the	  base	  category	  is	  not	  being	  concerned	  with	  the	  focal	  issue.	  	  The	  coefficient	  
estimates	  in	  Figure	  5A	  and	  B	  are	  computed	  over	  the	  set	  of	  respondents	  who	  gave	  valid	  responses	  in	  all	  three	  
waves	  these	  questions	  were	  included	  in	  the	  British	  Household	  Panel	  Study	  over	  the	  period	  1992-­‐1996.	  	  The	  
specifications	  also	  included	  individual-­‐level	  covariates	  to	  account	  for	  factors	  that	  affected	  respondents’	  
partisanship	  and	  issue	  concerns	  when	  they	  first	  entered	  the	  panel.	  	  	  The	  estimates	  on	  these	  coefficients	  are	  
available	  upon	  request.	  	  The	  lower	  figures	  (black	  bars)	  display	  the	  average	  proportion	  of	  quasi-­‐sentences	  in	  
party	  manifestos	  measured	  by	  the	  CMP	  devoted	  to	  the	  welfare	  +	  Labour	  groups	  	  (A),	  environment	  (B)	  averaged	  
across	  the	  two	  	  elections	  in	  1992	  and	  1997.	  	  These	  time	  points	  correspond	  to	  the	  individual-­‐level	  data	  
availability.	  	  
 
Figure 5 displays our estimates of the issue cueing and partisan updating effects that interest 
us, which reveal significant evidence of reciprocal linkages between British citizens’ issue priori-
ties and their party support.  The parameter estimates displayed in the top panel of Figure 5A de-
note that BHPS respondents’ lagged support for the Labour and Liberal Democratic parties en-
hanced their concern over unemployment at the current panel wave, and, reciprocally, that re-
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spondents’ lagged welfare concerns enhanced their probabilities of supporting the Labour and 
Liberal Democratic parties at the current panel.  The parameter estimates displayed in the top 
panel of Figure 5B imply similar positive issue cueing and partisan updating effects with respect 
to the Liberal Democratic Party over the environmental issue.  These estimates support the Recip-
rocal Effects Hypothesis (H1), that citizens’ issue salience both influences and is influenced by 
their partisan affiliations.  Furthermore, consistent with our Associative Issue Ownership Hypoth-
esis (H2), the reciprocal effects we estimate match the British parties’ issue emphases.  The bot-
tom panel of Figure 5A shows that Labour most strongly emphasized welfare issues in their 1992 
and 1997 election manifestos, while the Liberal Democrats most strongly emphasized the envi-
ronment (see the bottom panel of Figure 5B).60     
In summary, while the British party system does not feature a prominent niche party, so that 
we cannot evaluate the niche party hypothesis, our analyses of individual-level survey data from 
the British Household Panel Study – in conjunction with the CMP codings of British parties’ 
election manifestos – continue to support the Reciprocal Effects Hypothesis, in that we conclude 
that British citizens’ issue priorities both influence and are influenced by their partisan affilia-
tions, and the Associative Issue Ownership Hypothesis, that the British parties’ manifesto-based 
issue emphases are associated with citizens’ issue priorities and their party support.  These find-
ings on Britain, a political system that differs from Germany’s in that it features fewer major par-
ties, plurality-based elections, and (typically) single-party governments, suggest that the recipro-
cal issue cueing and partisan updating effects we identify – along with the links between citizens’ 
issue priorities and parties’ associative issue ownership – may constitute a general pattern across 
western European party systems. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
We believe our findings have several implications for issue ownership theory and for mass-elite 
issue linkages.  First, our results support the micro foundation of issue ownership theory.  We 
have presented theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that German and British citizens 
reward parties that emphasize the issue areas that voters consider salient, a partisan updating ef-
fect.  However, we also present evidence for an issue cueing effect, that citizens reciprocally up-
date their issue salience in response to their preferred party’s issue emphases.   
Furthermore, we have identified two party-level factors that moderate the individual-level 
partisan updating and issue cueing effects that we identify.  First, we present empirical support 
for an Associative Issue Ownership Hypothesis, that parties’ issue emphases as articulated in their 
election manifestos are associated with citizens’ tendencies to update their party support to fit 
their pre-existing issue priorities, and to reciprocally update their issue priorities to fit with their 
pre-existing party support.  Second, our findings supporting the Niche Party Hypothesis imply 
that the German Greens not only emphasize different issues from the mainstream parties, but that 
issue linkages between the Greens and their supporters voters are far stronger than the mass-elite 
linkages involving the CDU, SPD, and FDP.  This implies that the Greens’ electoral fortunes dis-
proportionally rise or fall based on their success in establishing the “terms of the debate” in Ger-
man national elections, i.e., that the issue emphasis model of electoral competition advanced by 
scholars such as Petrocik as well as Belanger and Meguid is especially relevant to the Greens.61  
Furthermore, our findings suggest that Green Party supporters’ strong environmental concerns – 
and their lack of concern about the economy, crime, and immigration – reflect not only German 
citizens choosing the Greens on the basis of their issue priorities, but the Green party’s success in 
shaping their supporters’ issue priorities. 
Our findings raise several questions for future research.  The first is: To what extent do our 
findings for the German Greens generalize to green parties outside of Germany, and to niche par-
                                                      
61 Petrocik 1996;  Belanger and Meguid 2008. 
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ties more generally?  We are cautious about answering this question, first because the British 
party system – the other case that we analyze here (and the only other European polity for which 
we have panel survey data that allows us to test our hypotheses) – does not feature a prominent 
green party (or any other niche party), so that we cannot evaluate the niche party hypthesis in this 
context.  Second, we note that while we have presented several alternative theoretical arguments 
in support our hypothesis, including arguments pertaining to niche parties’ organizational 
characteristics, the policy focus of niche parties’ political elites, and the greater political 
engagement of niche party supporters, our empirical analyses of the German Greens do not allow 
us to parse out these alternative explanations.  Hence while we believe we present a convincing 
case for the niche party hypothesis, we defer consideration of the generalizability of this finding 
for future research. 
Other issues that we plan to explore in future research include the character of mass-elite is-
sue linkages with respect to the small, far left German party Die Linke (formerly the Party of 
Democratic Socialism), which only become relevant in West German politics after 2004; whether 
parties’ issue emphases respond to their supporters’ issue concerns even as these parties 
reciprocally cue their supporters’ concerns (as we demonstrate in this paper); whether parties can 
cue citizens’ issue concerns in the wider public, i.e., beyond those who are their current 
supporters;62 and, how the reciprocal partisan updating and issue cueing processes we identify are 
mediated by citizens’ levels of education and political interest.   
Finally, in future research we will explore the linkages between parties’ issue emphases and 
their issue positions.  While here  we treat parties’ issue emphases as distinct from their positions,  
for some issue areas that we analyze parties’ issue emphases correlate with their positions, in that 
parties that emphasize the environment (such as the German Greens) or crime (such as the 
German CDU) also take distinct positions on these issues – and the same pattern plausibly holds 
at the level of the mass public.  To parse out how the individual-level effects we estimate jointly 
                                                      
62 Hobolt et al. 2009. 
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depend on citizens’ positional- and emphasis-based considerations will require individual-level 
panel data that incorporates positional and salience items in the same survey – data which to our 
knowledge is not currently available.  Such analyses could allow us to enhance our understanding 
of how saleince and position-based considerations reciprocally influence citizens’ party support.   
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